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et al.: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, by Robert A. Leflar (BobbsMerrill Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. lxxvi, 677. $12.50).
When Dean Leflar's The Law of Conflict of Laws was published in 1959, its value for law students and practitioners was
widely recognized by the reviewers. 1 His experience as law
teacher and as appellate judge, his practical turn of mind and
faculty for simple and clear expression, his service as survey
editor of Conflict of Laws for the New York University Annual
Survey of American Law, all combined to give him unusual
qualifications as intermediary for the less experienced reader
approaching a controversial and highly theoretical subject. As
a result the 1959 product, although concededly neither a detailed
practice manual nor an in-depth analytical treatise, was a work
which delineated the outlines of the subject while to a considerable extent furnishing documentation which enabled the reader
to explore further the literature on any point in issue.
In the nine years since publication of The Law of Conflict of
Laws, both jurists and theorists have been active. Seen from the
perspective of today it is hard to conceive of a pre-Babcock,
Clay, Bernkrant era, 2 to mention but several of the cases which
since have become landmarks. In the preface to his 1968 work
Dean Leflar thus states the new developments:
The last decade has produced much new conflicts
law in other areas as well as in choice of law. Within
that period the long-arm statutes have become routine,
though their ultimate reach remains uncertain. FederalState law relationships have been slightly clarified.
The full faith and credit clause is a bit nearer to being
awakened from almost two centuries of sleep. A dozen
other conflicts tools and "rules" have been re-examined
by courts and scholars ....
1. E.g., Book Reviews, 14 ARE. L. Rtv. 183 (1960); 45 CORNELL L.Q. 611
(1960); 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1105 (1960); 13 S.C.L.Q. 138 (1960).
2. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Bernkrant v. Fowler,
55 Cal. 2d 588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906 (1961); Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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Viewed solely as an updating of his earlier work the new
Leflar is valuable for the author's own comments on the later
cases and for his collation of critical opinion on developments of
the last decade. In length the text of the revision is almost
half-again longer than its predecessor and the citation of cases
and law reviews has been greatly expanded.
Reading the new book, however, one is immediately struck
with the fact that it is more than a revision and supplementation
of the earlier work. Indeed, the preface thus states the author's
more challenging goal:
The title of this book abandons the traditional term
Conflict of Laws and uses the vernacular "Conflicts."
The new title is intended to be characteristic of the book,
representing a mild break with the past, a recognition
that the law requires both new language and new
analysis if it is to be described, or explained, in realistic
fashion ....
In this work, I have not tried to frame
a formula [for choice of law]. Rather, my attempt has
been to identify the choice-influencing considerations
themselves and seek to understand, as well as to predict, results in the light of these considerations. The
purpose is to bring the judicial process out into the
open.
Evidence of this new dimension of Dean Leflar's book is
found principally in Chapters 10 and 11, entitled respectively
"Choice of Law Theories" and "Choice Influencing Considerations." Of particular interest is the latter chapter, which, after
reviewing the Cheatham and Reese summary of policy factors
affecting choice of law solutions, the "objectives" of Professor
Yntema, and the Cavers "principles of preference," then states
and summarizes the content of the author's own "choice-influencing considerations." Representing as they do the insights and
opinions of a perceptive and long time observer of the changing
trends and fashions in choice of law theory, they are of interest
to scholar as well as of value to practitioner and judge. In fact,
their value to the bench and bar is well attested by their use by

the courts in the decision of recent cases.$
3. See Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Heath v.
Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W2d 664 (1967).
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By reason of the author's increased attention to underlying
postulates, Dean Leflar's revision of his book is for law student,
practitioner and judge an even more valuable vade mecum than
was its predecessor. For his fellow academicians the book is of
interest as the considered judgments of a contemporary master
of the subject of Conflicts of Laws.
DAVID H. MEANs
Professor of Law
University of South Carolina
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THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS, by Murray Teigh Bloom
(Simon and Schuster, 1968. Pp. 346. $6.50).
Many people think that laws-with the exception of the Ten
Commandments and the particular rule that benefits their case if
they happen to be litigating-are not really necessary. Since
laws, so goes the common belief, are man-made and therefore
"unnatural," there is no reason why people should have to put
up with them. I like to think that those holding to this innocent
view of the workings of society could be convinced that some
sort of rules beyond the simple injunctions against killing one's
fellows or stealing their property are not only necessary but
desirable. And if sweet reason could not persuade one holding
out for a non-law society, perhaps a neighbor putting up a
tanning factory next door would do the trick. As easy as it is to
topple the non-law argument, there lies behind it a subtler and
more firmly entrenched belief-the one that if we must have
laws, we should nonetheless not have lawyers. This idea was
current in the early colonies and still persists today. Laws, it is
thought, should be simple and unambiguous; they should be
clear enough for a man of average intelligence to read and understand and apply to his own problem. Those holding this view
take it as self-evident that laws can be written that will command
universal agreement as to their meaning and that people will be
guided in their dealings with their fellow men by whatever the
laws provide; however, this ideal, which is almost an article of
faith, has seldom if ever been exemplified in the past. More
to the point is the obvious fact that the legal profession has not
developed in a vacuum but in response to a real and continuing
need.
Happily, in his book, The Trou5e with Lawyers, Murray
Teigh Bloom at the outset recognizes that lawyers are necessary
to our way of life and that "the utopian idea of doing away with
lawyers is not for our time-or for our children's time." But
having thus legitimized the profession in general, Mr. Bloom then
attempts to show that in their everyday dealings with clients
most individual lawyers behave rather badly. The author is not
primarily concerned with the small number of lawyers who actually cheat and steal from their clients, although he does recount
incidents of alleged dishonesty with some gusto. What really
irks him is his conception of the majority of lawyers, "fairly
honest, more or less upright and, in the main, quite decent men,"
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who victimize their clients with excessive fees and, at times, with
incompetence.
The author, who is a professional news and magazine writer,
has done a considerable amount of research into the attorneyclient relationship. His sources included lawyers, judges, bar
committees, law professors, news reporters, and disgruntled
clients.
After detailing the experiences of several persons who had entrusted funds to their attorneys and had them stolen, or of
insurance settlements that never reached the clients' pockets, Mr.
Bloom advocates the establishment of client security funds by
local bar associations. Although such funds have been proposed fairly often, they are rarely set up because lawyers, of
course, resent the implication that the public needs to be protected from members of the profession. A further problem is
that where client security funds do exist, no one, including many
lawyers, knows about them. Publicity would invite frivolous
charges and claims and reduce public confidence in the bar.
In one biting chapter the author berates the excessive contingent fee in personal injury cases-50 percent, the prevailing
fee in Kansas City, Missouri-which he thinks is excessive. He
is also very critical of the use of minimum fee schedules by
many bars; he declares that minimum fee agreements by lawyers
represent price fixing and are against the public interest.
Especially are minimum fees unfair in probate matters, according to the author. A 1966 survey is quoted which shows that the
highest average probate fee is charged in New Mexico-$5,150
-while South Carolina's $1900 is the second lowest.
There is a rather detailed account of abuses in the New York
Surrogate Court system which has jurisidction over estates and
guardianships. Fees here are very handsome, according to Bloom,
and the prize appointments as special guardians and estate appraisers go to political cronies. Much of the material for the
best-seller, Fow to Avoid Probate, is based on the practices in
the New York court.
In another chapter the author discusses and apparently adopts
the view that it should be as easy to get a divorce as it is to
marry. He envisions an agency to investigate the marriage and
authorize a divorce if appropriate. Fault as the principle of
divorce should be abolished. Lawyers of course would not be
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needed. The author's main argument here is with the law rather
than with the lawyers-as it is many times throughout the
book-but he does object strenuously to basing the fee on the
wealth of the husband. He thinks a flat hourly fee would be
better, the effect being to prevent the lawyer from becoming a
"9partner." Of course what is missing from this argument is
the fact that when a husband is involved in divorce proceedings
his whole wealth is put in jeopardy from property division or
alimony payments lurking in the background. It is not unreasonable for the fee to bear some relationship to the magnitude of
the peril from which the husband escapes with his attorney's
assistance.
There is an instructive chapter on the working of bar grievance
committees. With the exception of the disciplinary procedure
now operating in Manhatten and the Bronx, the author concludes
that nowhere in the United States has a state bar association
done an outstanding job in lawyer discipline. Inadequate personnel, lack of funds, endless delays, and the reluctance of lawyers to punish their fellow lawyers account for the failure, as
the author sees it, of the Bar to live up to its obligation of selfregulation. In addition to tolerating unethical conduct by lawyers, the Bar also encourages incompetence among its members
by making it almost impossible to succeed in a malpractice
suit against a lawyer. The judiciary also bears the blame for
this situation, in the author's opinion.
In the chapter entitled "Why We Don't Like Lawyers" the
author assembles a veritable chamber of horrors of anti-lawyer
quotations, the type lawyers like to repeat at professional dinners. This chapter, which contains everything from Shakespeare's "First we kill all the lawyers" to a modern psychoanalytic judgment on the temperament of the profession, certainly proves the observation of a Texas bar official that "by
its very nature, the legal profession is the most abused and least
understood profession in the world."
When he reads this book the practicing lawyer will be constantly frustrated at his inability to answer some of its more
gratuitous charges and implications about the profession he
knows better than anyone else. A little cross-examination would
certainly be in order for many of the quoted sources of information and misinformation. But, on the other hand, there is much
serious matter in the book which all lawyers and judges should
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read and ponder. The public view of the nature of the profession and of lawyers, even if it is not accurate, is nevertheless the
effective attitude which the practitioner must meet daily. This
book suggests that there is a great task of explanation and
education to be undertaken by each individual lawyer in dealing
with his clients and the public. Hopefully, it will serve as a
beginning of greater understanding, if not love.
PAUL R. hIMBWan
Associate, Johnson & Smith
Spartanburg, South Carolina
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